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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

26 June 1979

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director for Central Intelligence

VIA: Robert R. Bowie
Deputy Director for National Foreign AssessmentRichard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for WarningFROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE

Summary

Community analysts, meeting on 19 June, continue to focus on the unresolved Soviet problem arising from the decaying security situation in Afghanistan. There has been a new round of Soviet public and private protests against foreign -- particularly Pakistani -- support for the rebels, and some Soviet private statements implied a warning that Afghan military forces might cross into Pakistan in reprisal. The attention of Community analysts was drawn to the continuing incremental growth of the Soviet [REDACTED] in Cam Ranh Bay, which has become the most important and most firmly established Soviet military facility observed in Vietnam to date. (Secret [REDACTED])

1. Afghanistan: Community analysts continue to focus on the unresolved Soviet problem arising from the security situation in Afghanistan, which still appears to be slowly decaying. A few days after the warning meeting, the first outbreak of anti-government violence in Kabul, while quickly suppressed, provided new evidence of the fragility of the regime's position. Analysts noted that in the last month there had been a new round of Soviet public and private protests against foreign -- particularly Pakistani -- support for the rebels, apparently prompted by additional evidence that Pakistan was indeed encouraging anti-regime tribesmen to cross the border. Some of the Soviet private statements implied a warning that Afghan military forces might cross into Pakistan in reprisal. Yet a number of analysts felt the Soviets were continuing to show great caution in avoiding statements that might imply acceptance

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of an obligation to intervene with Soviet forces to rescue the regime. Some analysts cited fragmentary and inconclusive evidence suggesting that the Soviets may be searching for alternative personalities to broaden the political base of the Taraki regime. In sum, the consensus appeared to believe that the Soviets were continuing to temporize, that they remained very reluctant to undertake ground combat intervention, and that they would go on delaying any decision on this as long as they could. []

(2.) Southeast Asia: The attention of Community analysts was drawn to the incremental growth of Soviet [] in Cam Ranh Bay.

[] In view of the political significance of this concrete evidence suggesting a long-term Vietnamese quid pro quo for Soviet assistance, Community collectors are urged to give priority attention to this complex and to any evidence that additional facilities [] will be established there. []

3. Berlin: Analysts considered the possibility that the Soviets might take some demonstrative steps in reaction to the election of Berlin representatives to the European Parliament. Prior to the Vienna summit, Soviet diplomats had hinted that the USSR might take -- or authorize -- some measure of reprisal after the summit. While the majority of specialists were, on balance, somewhat skeptical that the Soviets would wish to raise tensions in this way at the outset of the SALT ratification debate, analysts nevertheless would not rule out the possibility that the GDR might be allowed to institute some measures of harrassment, possibly on the autobahns. []

-2-

SECRET

26 June 1979

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-3-

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26 June 1979

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